

EXHIBIT J

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

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- 13-03 10:39A SFOSY-CORPORATE SAFETY 1

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10/07/2003

Subject: A/C Damage involving UA 809-KIX & NH07-NRT
 Narrative from Interview with SOR Ed Loh
 Interview conducted by Tim Silveira, Manager of Station Operation Center
 PCE Shop Steward / CSR George Sheer, was present during the entire interview.

SOR Ed Loh, assigned to work in the G Tower, was asked to write a statement describing the events surrounding the incident. After reviewing the statement (see attached) he was then interviewed and the following information was identified.

- NH flight 07 to NRT was assigned to gate 95
- At 1148 NH 07 called the "G" tower to request permission to "push" or dispatch from the gate
- SOR Ed Loh responded that they were clear to push but do not pull forward after push and use caution as an aircraft was being delivered to gate 99, an adjacent gate 2 gates away.
- At approximately 1151, NH 07 called and asked permission to begin "taxi".
- Ed Loh responded that they were clear to pull forward and taxi to Spot 10 (an area located just behind gates 102 and 100) and they would then need to contact ground radio (the FAA tower), per normal process.
- Ed Loh then turned his attention to gates 81-85, as we had a number of A/C scheduled to arrive and depart.
- At 1154 UA 809, which was at gate 101, called for "push"
- Ed Loh looked down at gate 102, and not seeing NH 07 in his line of sight, cleared UA 809 to push
- Ed Loh then directed his attention to gate 80, where a pick up and delivery was scheduled.
- After noticing the pick up of flight 75 at gate 80, was behind, he called MM 292 (MM Foreman located in SOC) to inquire about the status of the pick up and delivery planned
- During this conversation he directed his attention again in the area where UA 809 was pushing and witnessed NH 07 strike the wing tip of UA 809.
- He immediately hung up with 292 and called the Gate Controller (John Ginty) in the SOC to report the incident.
- While speaking with the Gate Controller, the Captain of UA 809 called the tower and requested fire engines be brought out. Ed relayed this request to the Gate Controller, as is the practice. John Ginty then notified the Shift Manager, Dan Digesti, and then proceeded to call fire department with the request.
- A short time later, Ed Loh received a call from 2 inbound UA flights, requesting instructions for arrival to gate. Ed advised them to hold at Bravo 3, an area outside the UA terminal, and he would return with further instruction.
- He then advised all A/C at gates that were to depart soon, to hold their position until further notice.
- Airfield Safety (No name given) then called the Tower and advised Ed Loh they were closing Bravo and Bravo 3. Ed informed them of the 2 UA A/C holding in the area and was given permission to allow them to taxi to the gates at the domestic terminal.

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- He then relayed info in the inbound flights and they were advised to taxi into gates 83 & 72 using caution.
- He then received a call from the MM Foreman at the incident scene, to advise them that UA MM would be bringing the NH A/C back to gate 95. He asked Ed to notify AGI (The group that oversees gate assignments in the Intl terminal) and the flight crew of NH 07. Ed advised the MM Foreman that NH 07 was now on ground radio and he could not contact them. He agreed to call AGI for the gate use.
- During this period he received multiple calls for Zone 5 (Handles the Intl Flights) and the Shift Manager asking for status reports.
- He then received a call from the FAA asking what the current plan was. He advised them that Airfield Safety was closing Bravo and Bravo 1.
- Another call was received from Airfield Safety (No Name) Requesting information as to what had occurred. He advised them he had not seen the entire sequence of events. They replied that they needed details. He advised that he could not supply the details he was asking for.
- Ed Loh was then relived by SOR John Campos and was advised that a van was waiting to take him to the SOC to begin the investigation.

When asked if any of the A/C seemed to be in a position it should not have been he replied he could not tell as the collision had caused the UA A/C to shift a bit.

When asked if there was any issue with the pushback, he replied that all CG pushbacks are a bit different, but that he saw nothing abnormal.

He advised that he had not been watching the initial push of 809, as he was tending to other matters.

He advised that when UA 809 called to push, he did not see NH 07 in his line of sight and thought it had already taxied by. He did not look beyond his line of sight to determine if it had. He advised that the normal time from request to push and taxiing beyond Spot 10 was 104-105 minutes. It had been 106 minutes from the time NH 07 called for push and UA 809 called for push. This bolstered his thinking that NH 07 had already taxied by when UA 809 called for push.

Another employee in the Tower, working for Skywest, UAX Carrier, was present but that he does not normally use that person as a point of reference.

He reported that there were no unusual incidents or circumstances outside the norm. He felt he was always under control and was operating normal.

He advised he had been working the "C" or "Shadow" for all of 2003. (The Shadow Tower is another area manned by SFOOO to handle receipt and dispatch in the 68-71 & 76-79, as well as the north side of the AA terminal.) He further advised that he had work in these areas about 50% of his assigned time in 2002. He felt very comfortable with his skill level and the job assigned.

He was alert and lucid during the entire process.

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2003 6th floor
2001 in Shadow

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When asked what he would have done differently, he advised he would have insured NH 07 had cleared, and if not, he would have either held the push of 80Y, or advised them to use caution and alert them to give way to NH 07. He failed to do either of these.

SOR ED Loh was then dispatched to UA Medical for a fitness for duty check. A urine sample was taken at that time and he was asked to return Wednesday, Oct 8, for a further physical.

Tim Silveira
Manager of Station Operations Control
SFCCO

Date: _____

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